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1. INTRODUCTION
The railroad system in Switzerland consists of two sectors. The ﬁrst sector includes
the international and inter-regional transports. This sector is monopolized by the
Swiss Federal Railways, which operates more than half of the railway networks in
Switzerland. The second sector provides regional and local transport services that
account for about a third of Switzerland’s railway passengers. Today, this sector
consists of 49 Regional Railway Companies (RRC) with an average network length
of approximately 40 km.1 In general the main function of an RRC is to link a
rural region to the intercity railway network or to an urban transport network.
The RRCs operate with a regional monopoly license given by the Confedera-
tion.2 This license deﬁnes the RRC’s responsibilities, which imply an obligation to
provide regular services according to a ﬁxed time table and to apply the ofﬁcial
tariff scheme. Moreover, the RRC receives subsidies for their deﬁcit in operating
costs and the infrastructure investments from the Confederation and the corre-
sponding canton.
In 1996, following an alarming growth in government subsidies for railway
transport in Switzerland, the federal government introduced a series of regulatory
reforms.3 In particular, the subsidization of RRCs that was previously based on
full coverage of deﬁcits has been replaced by an ex-ante ﬁxed payment system. The
federal and cantonal governments commission the transport companies for services
on the basis of an estimated compensation deﬁned in advance to cover the planned
costs, which are not otherwise covered. In addition, the new regulations provide
the possibility of competitive tendering for assigning the licenses, whereby the most
performing railway companies would be incited to offer the transport service sat-
isfying the conditions imposed by the cantonal regulator. However, tendering is an
optional measure and has not been used in any cantons to date.
Although the ex-ante ﬁxed payment rule represents an improvement with respect
to previous subsidization practices, without a benchmarking analysis it does not
contain incentives to minimize costs. Given that these subsidies are determined
through a long series of negotiations and bargaining between railway companies
and the corresponding cantonal governments, companies might use their local
1 The regional railways are owned by different Swiss governments (Confederation, cantons and
municipalities) and by some private investors. However, the share of private ownership is low.
2 Switzerland is a confederation composed of 26 cantons and approximately 3000 municipalities.
Each canton has a high degree of autonomy in the organization, planning and regulation of the
local public transport.
3 In 1995 the Swiss parliament approved the revision of the Railway Act (1995), which came into
effect as of January 1, 1996. Moreover, in 1999, following the changes in the transport policy at
the European level (EC Directive 91/440), further measures have been introduced. These measures
include reinforcement of the ﬁxed payment system; separation of infrastructure and transport
services in terms of organization and accounting; and provision of open network access in freight
transport. The latter does not apply to regional railways, which mainly provide short-distance
passenger services.
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monopoly power to maintain high subsidies. Therefore, in the last years some
cantonal authorities have begun to use simple benchmarking analysis of costs to
determine the level of subsidies. The federal and cantonal authorities have been
discussing the possibility to adopt high-powered incentive contracts based on yard-
stick competition model proposed by Schleifer (1985).4 In this context cost frontier
models could be useful as a benchmarking tool to induce efﬁciency but also as a
complementary control instrument to determine the amount of subsidies granted
to the RRCs. A similar approach has been used in the regulation of water supply
in Italy, where a yardstick competition model based on cost estimation has been
applied (Antonioli and Filippini 2001).
A number of studies such as Cantos and Maudos (2001), Coelli and Perelman
(2000) and Gathon and Perelman (1992) have explored the application of fron-
tier models in railways. However, only a few papers have adopted a stochastic
frontier approach.5 Railway networks are characterized by a high level of output
heterogeneity. Networks with different shapes and densities have different organiza-
tion and coordination problems, thus different costs. Furthermore, environmental
characteristics such as topography and climate can inﬂuence the operating costs.
In many cases, the information is not available for all output and environmental
characteristics. Many of these characteristics are therefore omitted from the cost
function speciﬁcations. Moreover, there exist other omitted variables such as differ-
ences across companies in accounting procedures that are generally not taken into
account.
Unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity can be taken into account with conven-
tional ﬁxed or random effects in a panel data model. In order to distinguish exter-
nal heterogeneities from cost efﬁciency, Greene (2005, 2004) proposed an approach
that integrates an additional stochastic term representing inefﬁciency in both ﬁxed
and random effects models.6 These models assume that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc hetero-
geneity does not change over time but sources of inefﬁciency vary both across
ﬁrms and over time. In this paper we use a ‘true random-effects’ model, which is
a random-constant frontier model, obtained by combining a conventional random-
effects model with a skewed stochastic term representing inefﬁciency. The extended
model includes separate stochastic terms for latent heterogeneity and inefﬁciency.
Since many of the unobserved factors, especially those related to the network’s
shape, are likely to be correlated with the output and perhaps other explanatory
variables, the random-effect estimators of the cost function coefﬁcients could be
4 For a discussion of this issue see Tromp (2003) and Federal Ofﬁce of Transport (2003). See also
Dalen and Go`mez-Lobo (2003) for an application of yardstick competition in another transport
sector namely, bus industry.
5 See Oum et al. (1999) for a survey of this literature.
6 Kumbhakar (1991) proposed a similar approach using a three-stage estimation procedure. See also
Heshmati and Kumbhakar (1994) and Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995) for two applications
of this model.
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biased. To overcome this shortcoming, the ‘true random-effects’ model has been
adjusted using Mundlak’s (1978) formulation.7
The empirical results obtained from true random effects models in a variety
of applications suggest that modeling unobserved heterogeneity could signiﬁcantly
decrease the inefﬁciency estimates.8 This could lend certain support to the applica-
tion of benchmarking methods in the regulation of strongly heterogeneous network
industries, in which the conventional inefﬁciency estimates appear to be overstated.
Provided that they can sufﬁciently control for the unobserved heterogeneity across
ﬁrms, these methods can be used to estimate an order of magnitude of cost-inefﬁ-
ciency in the sector or individual companies. In addition, in the case of the Swiss
regional railway sector, such analyses could be used to evaluate the subsidies for
transport services.
The purpose of this paper is to study the potential advantages of these extended
models in an application to Switzerland’s railway companies. In particular, our
eventual interest is in models that can exploit the advantage of a ﬁxed-effects
model to have an unbiased estimate of the cost function without compromising
the estimates of inefﬁciency scores. The models are estimated for a sample of 50
railway companies operating in Switzerland from 1985 to 1997. The alternative
models are compared regarding the cost function slopes and inefﬁciency estimates.
The conventional FE estimators of the cost function coefﬁcients are assumed to
be unbiased, thus used as a benchmark to which other models are compared. For
the inefﬁciency estimates, the correlation between different models and the effect of
econometric speciﬁcation have been analyzed. The results suggest that the inefﬁ-
ciency estimates are substantially lower when the unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects
are taken into account.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3, respectively, pres-
ent the model speciﬁcation and the methodology. The data are explained in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 presents the estimation results and discusses their implications,
and Section 5 provides the conclusions.
2. Model Speciﬁcation
A railway company can be considered as an aggregate production unit that oper-
ates in a given network and transforms labor, capital and energy inputs into units
of transport services such as passenger-kilometers of public transport and ton-kilo-
meters of freight. Given the extremely large number of different transport services,
the measure of output requires an aggregation of outputs in one way or another.9
7 See Farsi et al. (2005) for a discussion of Mundlak’s adjustment in frontier models.
8 See for instance Greene (2004), Farsi et al. (2006) and Alvarez et al. (2004).
9 Theoretically, any relation between any two points in the network could be deﬁned as an output
type. Estimating a multi-product cost function with so many outputs is practically impossible thus,
an aggregation process is inevitable.
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The commonly used measures of output are the number of passenger-kilometers
and freight ton-kilometers (Caves et al. 1985; Cantos et al. 1999) and number of
wagon-kilometers (Filippini and Maggi 1993; Todani 2001).
A practical way of attenuating the approximation errors due to aggregation is
to include output characteristics such as network length or average haul in the
model. Different strategies have been used in the literature. Caves et al. (1985)
consider the average lengths of trip for freight and passengers and the num-
ber of route miles as output characteristics. Filippini and Maggi (1993) have
included the network length in their model speciﬁcation. Ivaldi and Mc Cul-
lough (2001) and Todani (2001) considered three types of wagon-miles (high-val-
ued, bulk and others) as three main outputs and accounted for average length
of haul and the number of road miles as output characteristic. Other papers
like Mizutani (2004) and Savage (1997) include additional output characteris-
tics such as number of lines, load factor and station spacing. The empirical
evidence suggests that all these characteristics could have signiﬁcant effects on
costs, therefore should be included in the cost model. However, in practice many
of these variables are not available in which case more restricted models are
used.
Unfortunately, because of lack of sufﬁcient data on many variables ordinarily
used in the literature, in this paper we had a restricted choice of speciﬁcation. We
assumed a double-output production process. The outputs are transported passen-
gers measured by the total number of passenger-kilometers in a given year and
the transported freight measured as the aggregate number of ton-kilometers. The
length of network is included in the model as output characteristics. Three input
factors are considered: labor, capital and energy. A total cost function has been
considered.10
Based on the above speciﬁcation the total cost frontier can be represented by the
following cost function:
T C =f (Y,Q,N,PK,PL,PE, dt ), (1)
where TC is the total annual costs; Y andQ are the numbers of passenger-kilome-
ters and ton-kilometers, respectively; PK , PL and PE are, respectively, the prices
of capital, labor and energy; N is the length of network and dt is a vector includ-
ing 12 year dummies from 1986 to 1997 (year 1985 is the omitted category). The
10 In a preliminary analysis we also estimated a variable cost function. However, the results indicatea
positive derivative of the variable cost function with respect to the capital stock, which violates the
non-increasing regularity condition. Following Guyomard and Vermersch (1989) and Filippini
(1996) we believe that this problem is due to the empirical difﬁculty in deﬁning the capital stock
variable. Due to lack of data we have used a physical measure of the capital stock, which is highly
correlated with output and gives rise to a multi-collinearity problem. For this reason we preferred
a total cost function, assuming that the companies can modify their capital expenses on a yearly
basis. Insofar as this is equally applicable to all companies, the benchmarking analysis is not
sensitive to such an assumption.
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year dummies capture the cost changes associated with technical progress as well
as other unobserved year-speciﬁc factors.11
It is generally assumed that the cost function given in (1) is the result of
cost minimization given input prices and output and should therefore satisfy cer-
tain properties.12 Mainly, this function must be non-decreasing, concave, linearly
homogeneous in input prices and non-decreasing in output. To estimate the cost
function (1), a Cobb–Douglas (log-linear) functional form is employed. We also
evaluated the possibility of applying a translog functional form that can account
for variation of scale economies with output. However, we decided to exclude
this model because it requires a relatively large number of parameters, which cre-
ates certain numerical problems in the simulated likelihood maximization for the
random-constant model. Moreover, our preliminary estimations (not reported here)
showed that this functional form resulted in counter-intuitive results for the sign
of output variables. This is perhaps due to multicollinearity problems caused by
strong correlation between the second order terms in translog form.
The concavity assumption is automatically satisﬁed in Cobb–Douglas form. The
linear homogeneity restriction can be imposed by normalizing the costs and prices
by the price of one of the input factors. Here we considered the energy as the num-
eraire good. The other theoretical restrictions are veriﬁed after the estimation. The
cost function can therefore be written as:
ln
(
T Cit
PEit
)
= α0 +αY lnYit + αQ lnQit + αN lnNit +αS lnSit
+ αK ln PKit
PEit
+αL ln PLit
PEit
+
1997∑
t=1986
αtdt +αi + εit (2)
with i =1,2, . . . ,N and t =1,2, . . . , Ti
Subscripts i and t denote the company and year, respectively, αi is a ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc effect and εit is an iid error term. As we will explain in the next section, in
the recent models proposed by Greene (2005), the stochastic term εit is composed
of two parts: a skewed component representing inefﬁciency and a symmetric part
for the random noise.
The adopted speciﬁcation given in (2) has two restrictions. First, as discussed
earlier some output characteristics are omitted form the model. These omitted
variables lower the statistical efﬁciency of the model by increasing the variance
of the error components. Therefore, the inefﬁciency scores might be overesti-
mated. The unobserved factors could also bias the estimation results should they
11 In the cost function estimations it is common to use a linear trend for technical progress. However,
our preliminary regressions indicated that the time-variation of costs is strongly non-linear. In fact
there is a gradual increase in the beginning of the sample period followed by a decrease in costs.
These variations can be explained by many unobserved factors (such as changes in collective labor
contracts or seasonal composition of the demand) that change uniformly across companies.
12 For more details on the functional form of the cost function see Cornes (1992, 106).
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be correlated with the explanatory variables. Second, as opposed to a ﬂexible
functional form like translog, the adopted Cobb–Douglas form does not allow for
any second-order terms. The ﬁrst implication is that the value of scale economies
is assumed to be constant regardless of the output level. Given that most of the
Swiss regional railway companies are relatively small this assumption is not very
restrictive. However, noting that the effects of second-order terms are suppressed
into the error components, they could have a similar effect as that of the omitted
variables explained above.
In principle, some of the above shortcomings could be addressed by includ-
ing the input factor demand (share) equations and solving the resulting system
of equations with the appropriate cross-equation restrictions. However, combin-
ing these equations with a stochastic frontier model needs an econometric devel-
opment, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The main problem is the fact
that the allocative inefﬁciencies enter the demand equations, thus create a complex
error structure (Greene 1997, 127). As Kumbhakar and Lovell have pointed out, a
“satisfactory econometric speciﬁcation” to such a system of equations “remains to
be developed” (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000, 170).
The discussed shortcomings should be considered in the light of this paper’s
objective, which is focused on illustrating the application of alternative economet-
ric models and evaluating their differences. In view of this fact and the practical
difﬁculties explained above, we contend that the adopted speciﬁcation is suitable
for the purpose of this paper. However, we would like to stress that the estimated
values reported here, of both cost efﬁciency and scale economies cannot be directly
used for practical purposes. Rather, the estimation results can only be considered
for illustrative purposes and qualitative comparison of different models.
3. Econometric Models
Stochastic frontier models have been subject of a great body of literature resulting
in a large number of econometric models to estimate cost functions. Kumbhakar
and Lovell (2000) provide an extensive survey of this literature. The main mod-
els used in this paper are based on Greene’s (2005) extension of the original fron-
tier approach proposed by Aigner et al. (1977). In this framework, εit as given
in speciﬁcation (2), is assumed to be a composite stochastic term with a normal-
half-normal distribution, including both idiosyncratic effects and inefﬁciencies. The
additional ﬁrm-speciﬁc term, αi in Equation (2), represents the unobserved heter-
ogeneity and is assumed to have a normal distribution. This model is referred to
as a “true” random-effects model.13 The estimation method is based on simulated
maximum likelihood.
13 The name “true” is chosen to show that the model keeps the original frontier framework and the
extension is done only by including an additional heterogeneity term.
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Table 1. Econometric Specifications of the Stochastic Cost Frontier
Model V
True RE with
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Mundlak
FE RE Pooled True RE Adjustment
Firm-specific Constant Half-normal None N(0, σ 2α ) αi =γ X¯i + δi
component αi N+(0, σ 2α )
X¯i = 1Ti
Ti∑
t=1
Xit
δi ∼N(0, σ 2δ )
Random iid (0, σ 2ε ) iid (0, σ 2ε ) εit =uit +vit εit =uit +vit εit =uit +vit
error εit
uit ∼N+(0, σ 2u ) uit ∼N+(0, σ 2u ) uit ∼N+(0, σ 2u )
vit ∼N(0, σ 2v ) vit ∼N(0, σ 2v ) vit ∼N(0, σ 2v )
Inefficiency αˆi −min{αˆi } E [αi |ωi1,ωi2, . . . ] E [uit |uit +vit ] E [uit |αi + εit ] E [uit |δi + εit ]
with ωit =αi + εit
The results are compared with other alternative models such as the ﬁxed-effects
model proposed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and the random-effects model pro-
posed by Pitt and Lee (1981). Both these models are covered by the general form
given in (2) with the difference that in the former model αi is a ﬁxed effect and εit
is a zero-mean error term with no distribution restriction, and in the latter (Pitt
and Lee) model αi is a random effect with half-normal (or truncated normal) dis-
tribution and εit is a normal random error term.
A summary of the ﬁve models used in the paper is given in Table 1. The ﬁrst
model is a ﬁxed effects (FE) model. In this model the ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects are con-
sidered as constant parameters that can be correlated with the
explanatory variables. The coefﬁcients are estimated through “within-ﬁrm” varia-
tions and therefore, are not affected by heterogeneity bias.14 In the cost frontier
literature the inefﬁciency scores are estimated as the distance from the ﬁrm with
the minimum estimated ﬁxed effect, that is αˆi −min{αˆi}, as proposed by Schmidt
and Sickles (1984).
Model II is a random effects (RE) model proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981),
which is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The ﬁrm’s inefﬁciency is
estimated using the conditional mean of the inefﬁciency term proposed by Jondrow
et al. (1982),15 that is: E [αi |ωi1,ωi2, . . . ]=E [αi |ω¯i ], where ωit =αi +εit and ω¯i =
1
Ti
∑Ti
t=1 ωit . A limitation of this model is the assumption that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc sto-
chastic term αi is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Moreover, in both
14 The term “heterogeneity bias” was used by Chamberlain (1982) for the bias due to correlation
between individual effects and explanatory variables in a random-effects model. See also Baltagi
(2001) for an extensive discussion of ﬁxed-effects (within) estimators.
15 See also Greene (2002).
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models (I and II), inefﬁciency indicators may include unobserved environmental
factors, thus may overstate the ﬁrms’ inefﬁciency. There are however two factors
that may exacerbate this problem in the FE model. First, unlike the RE model, the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects do not follow a single distribution, thus can have a relatively
wide range of variation. Second, these effects can be correlated with the explan-
atory variables, thus can also capture the heterogeneity factors that are correlated
with the regressors. Whereas in the RE model in which the ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects are
by construction uncorrelated with the regressors, these factors are suppressed at
least partially through the “between” variations, into the regression coefﬁcients.
In the ﬁrst two models (I and II), the ﬁrm’s inefﬁciency is assumed to be con-
stant over time, thus captured by the ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects, while in other models
inefﬁciency can vary across years. Model III is a pooled frontier model in that the
sample is considered as a cross-section and its panel aspect is neglected. The ran-
dom error term is divided into two components: a normal error term vit capturing
the noise and a half-normal random term uit representing the inefﬁciency as a one-
sided non-negative disturbance. This model is based on the original cost frontier
model proposed by Aigner et al. (1977). The ﬁrm’s inefﬁciency is estimated using
the conditional mean of the inefﬁciency term E [uit |uit +vit ], proposed by Jond-
row et al. (1982).
Models IV andV are extensions to model III that include an additional ﬁrm-
speciﬁc random effect (αi) to represent the unobserved heterogeneity among ﬁrms.
Model IV is Greene’s (2005) true RE model. In this model it is assumed that the
unobserved cost differences across ﬁrms that remain constant over time, are driven
by network-related unobserved characteristics rather than inefﬁciency. Given the
relatively long period covered in the data (12 years on average), this is a realistic
assumption. The inefﬁciency term is assumed to be an iid random variable with
half-normal distribution. This implies that the inefﬁciency is not persistent and
each period brings about new idiosyncratic elements thus new sources of inefﬁ-
ciency. This is a reasonable assumption particularly in industries that are con-
stantly facing new technologies. Therefore there are two justiﬁcations for such a
speciﬁcation in network industries: The ﬁrst one is a practical assumption that per-
sistent cost differences are related to unobserved heterogeneity across networks and
the second one is based on the conjecture that the sources of inefﬁciency in net-
work industries are dominated by new technology shocks and the incomplete adap-
tation of managers facing them.
Model V is an extension of model IV that uses Mundlak’s (1978) speciﬁcation
to account for the potential correlation of unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity
with the explanatory variables. Mundlak’s adjustment (Hsiao 2003, 44–46) can be
written as an auxiliary regression given by:
αi =γ X¯i + δi, X¯i = 1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
Xit , δi ∼N(0, σ 2δ ), (3)
where Xit is the vector of all explanatory variables and γ is the corresponding vec-
tor of coefﬁcients. Equation (3) actually divides the ﬁrm-speciﬁc stochastic term
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into two components: The ﬁrst part can be explained by exogenous variables,
whereas the remaining component (δi) is orthogonal to explanatory variables. The
advantage of this model is that it allows for a time-variant inefﬁciency term while
minimizing the heterogeneity bias. The heterogeneity bias can be avoided to the
extent that the auxiliary equation can capture the correlations.
In our comparative analysis we consider two aspects of the models’ perfor-
mance. The ﬁrst dimension is the estimation of the cost function’s coefﬁcients.
In railway companies the operating costs are affected by network characteristics,
which may be correlated with explanatory variables such as network’s size and
input factor prices. For instance, larger networks are more likely to have more
complex shapes. Denser networks are usually located in areas with higher popu-
lation density, where wages are relatively high. Such relationships imply a positive
correlation between the output level and labor price with the network complexity,
which is not fully captured by the included factors in the model. The Hausman
test is used to conﬁrm that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects are correlated with the explan-
atory variables. In this case the FE estimators (model I ) are unbiased, thus provide
a benchmark to which other models can be compared.
The second aspect of the models’ performance concerns the inefﬁciency esti-
mates. It is important to note that the consistency of slopes (coefﬁcients) does not
necessarily imply that inefﬁciency estimates are unbiased. Interestingly, the empiri-
cal results suggest that there is a trade-off in estimations. Namely, models (like the
FE model) with a good performance on slopes have strongly biased inefﬁciency
estimates. Roughly speaking, the heterogeneity bias may be suppressed into the
slopes as it appears in the RE model, or into the efﬁciency estimates as observed
in the FE model. Farsi et al. (2005) provide a discussion on this issue. The results
of that study on a sample of nursing homes suggest that Mundlak’s formulation
can be helpful to reduce the heterogeneity bias in both slopes and inefﬁciency esti-
mates at the same time. In this paper we use a similar approach to study if such
a conclusion can be applied to a network industry.
It should be noted that the inefﬁciency estimation requires a certain interpreta-
tion of the stochastic terms in the model. In the frontier literature, starting from
Aigner et al. (1977), it is commonly accepted that the skewed stochastic term with
a certain distribution represents inefﬁciency. Carree (2002) discusses some of the
implications of such distribution assumptions. For instance a half-normal distribu-
tion through its zero mode, implies that any company is most likely to be com-
pletely efﬁcient. Moreover, implicit in this model is the assumption that inefﬁciency
is uncorrelated with all exogenous variables and also with the idiosyncratic varia-
tions reﬂected in the symmetric error term.16 In fact, through this assumption all
the inefﬁciencies that are somehow related to exogenous variables such as factor
prices and output are excluded from the ﬁrm’s productive inefﬁciency. Later studies
16 Here, cost inefﬁciency is deﬁned as the excess costs due to the ﬁrm’s technical problems or to
suboptimal allocation of resources. Thus, scale inefﬁciencies, which are related to suboptimal
output, are excluded.
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like Cornwell et al. (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992) extended the original
framework to include exogenous variables in the distribution of the inefﬁciency
term. However, in this paper we maintain the original assumption such that the
efﬁciency measures are restricted to the sources that are completely uncorrelated
with all exogenous variables, which by deﬁnition are beyond the ﬁrm’s control. The
only exception is the FE model (model I ) that allows any correlation of inefﬁ-
ciency scores. Furthermore, we assume that the inefﬁciency can vary over time,
thus for the inefﬁciency estimates we focus on models III, IV and V .
4. Data
The data set used in this paper is extracted from the annual reports of the Swiss
Federal Ofﬁce of Statistics on public transport companies. The companies oper-
ating in main urban centers are excluded from the sample. Most of these com-
panies operate inner-city tramways and buses, whose functioning is quite different
from trains. We also excluded one other company whose extremely low total costs
and energy expenses suggest the possibility of a reporting error. The ﬁnal sample
includes 50 railway companies over a 13-year period from 1985 to 1997. The sam-
ple is an unbalanced panel with number of periods (Ti) varying from 1 to 13 and
with 45 companies with 12 or 13 years, resulting in 605 observations in total.17
The available information for any given year includes total costs, labor and energy
expenses separately, total number of employees, the quantity of consumed electric-
ity, network length, total number of seats and total number of train-kilometers,
passenger-kilometers and ton-kilometers.
Capital costs are calculated as the residual costs after deducting the labor and
energy expenses from the total costs. These costs are mainly related to equipment
and materials. Total number of seats is used as a proxy for capital stock.18 Thus,
the capital price is calculated as the residual expenses per seat. The passenger and
freight outputs are respectively, measured by the number of passenger-kilometers
and ton-kilometers. In Switzerland, each railway company is required to run a cer-
tain minimum number of trips per day for any given connection, speciﬁed by the
cantonal regulators. Therefore, the number of train-kilometers or wagon-kilometers
could be also an appropriate measure of passenger output. However, in order to be
consistent with the recent literature19 and also given that there is a high correlation
between train-kilometers and passenger-kilometers (a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.97
in our sample) we adopted the number of passenger-kilometers and ton-kilometers.
17 The average number of periods in the sample is 12 years. For 37 companies, the data are available
for 13 years. Eight other companies have 12 years available. The number of years available for the
remaining ﬁve companies is, respectively, 1, 3, 7, 7 and 10.
18 See Filippini and Prioni (2003) for a similar approach.
19 Some recent examples are Mancuso and Reverberi (2003), Estache et al. (2002), Cantos et al.
(1999) and Banos-Pino et al. (2002).
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (605 observations)
Standard
Mean Deviation Median Min. Max.
Total annual costs (TC) CHF million 26.73 49.88 8.83 2.12 307.43
Passenger output (Y) ×106 passenger-kms 30.80 55.10 10.00 0.41 311.00
Average cost (CHF per passenger-km) 1.20 0.76 1.09 0.33 5.98
Freight output (Q)×106 ton-kilometers 10.20 52.70 0.27 0.00015 477.00
Network length (N) (km) 39.43 56.64 22.82 3.90 377.00
Capital price (PK ) per seat (CHF ’000) 4.53 2.13 4.03 1.04 14.47
Average labor price (PL) per employee per 86.05 6.48 86.09 60.93 104.93
year (CHF ’000)
Energy (electricity) price (PE ) CHF/ kWh 0.157 0.023 0.158 0.076 0.265
All monetary values are in 1997 Swiss Francs (CHF), adjusted for inflation by Switzerland’s global consumer
price index.
All the costs and prices are adjusted for inﬂation using the Switzerland’s global
price index and are measured in 1997 Swiss Francs.
Table 2 provides a descriptive summary of the main variables used in the anal-
ysis. As it can be seen in this table, the total costs show a high variation in the
sample. The average cost of a passenger-kilometer varies from 0.3 to about 6 Swiss
Francs. There is also a considerable variation in input prices and both outputs in
the sample. Given the importance of within variations in most panel data mod-
els (especially the ﬁxed-effect model), it is helpful to distinguish these variations
from the variations across companies. Table 3 gives a summary of “within” and
“between” variations for the main variables used in the regressions. As it can be
seen in this table, the dependent variable and most explanatory variables show a
fairly considerable amount of within variation, supporting the use of a ﬁxed-effect
model. As expected, the within variation of network length is relatively low (lim-
ited to 7%).
5. Estimation Results
The estimation results for the ﬁve models are given in Table 4. These results show
that the output and input price coefﬁcients are positive and highly signiﬁcant
across all models. The estimated coefﬁcients show a considerable variation across
different models. The estimates from the pooled model (III) are particularly differ-
ent from those of other models. The year dummies are mostly signiﬁcant and sug-
gest that the cost variation over time is not linear. Again, the pooled model is an
exception in which none of these dummies show any statistically signiﬁcant effect.
Noting that model III completely ignores the panel structure of the data, its esti-
mates are likely to be strongly biased by omitted ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. On the
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Table 3. Within and Between Variations (50 companies and 12 years on average)
Standard Deviation
Mean Overall Between Within Fraction of within variation
ln
(TC
PE
)
11.31 1.10 1.12 0.15 0.14
ln (Y) 16.32 1.34 1.34 0.12 0.09
ln (Q) 12.49 2.72 2.78 0.61 0.22
ln (N) 3.20 0.91 0.93 0.06 0.07
ln
(
PK
PE
)
10.18 0.44 0.39 0.19 0.43
ln
(
PL
PE
)
13.22 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.62
For each variable (X) the between standard deviation is based on companies’ average values that is: X¯i =
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
Xit ; and the within standard deviation is based on deviations from companies’ averages (Xit − X¯i ). The
overall and within statistics are calculated over 605 company-years and the between statistics are calculated
over 50 companies. The fraction of within variation is calculated as the ratio of within to overall standard devi-
ation.
other hand the ﬁxed-effects estimators (model I ) are derived from the within-ﬁrm
variations and thus unbiased.
The year dummy coefﬁcients (excluding model III) show that the total costs of
railway companies rose almost linearly from 1985 to 1992 with an average annual
growth rate of about 1.6%, but declined after 1992 with an average rate of about
1.5% per year. Since total costs and all the continuous explanatory variables are
in logarithms, the estimated coefﬁcients can be interpreted as average cost elastic-
ities. For instance, the output coefﬁcients suggest that on average a one percent
increase in passenger-kilometers will increase the costs by 0.11–0.49% depending
on the adopted speciﬁcation. The marginal effect of ton-kilometers is about 10
times lower, suggesting substantially lower variable costs for freight transportation.
The coefﬁcient of network length indicates that the marginal cost of a one percent
extension in the network keeping the output constant, is approximately equivalent
to 0.4% increase in costs. These results are consistent with the previous empirical
results regarding Switzerland’s railroad industry (Filippini and Maggi 1993) in that
they suggest increasing returns to scale.
Table 4 also indicates that if the pooled model is set aside, the input price coefﬁ-
cients do not vary signiﬁcantly across different models. The coefﬁcient of labor
price, varying between 0.55 and 0.57 (bar model III), is actually comparable to
the average share of labor expenses, which is about 52% in the sample. The capital
price coefﬁcient varies between 0.31 and 0.32 (model III excluded), which is con-
siderably below the average share of capital costs in the sample (44%). This result
may suggest that the companies are not so responsive as a constantly cost minimiz-
ing behavior should be, to the changes in capital prices. This can be explained by
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Table 4. Regression Results
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
FE RE Pooled True RE True RE + Mundlak
αY 0.114* (0.032) 0.200* (0.030) 0.492* (0.015) 0.133* (0.023) 0.106* (0.034)
αQ 0.014* (0.006) 0.021* (0.003) 0.030* (0.006) 0.038* (0.004) 0.017* (0.003)
αN 0.448* (0.051) 0.485* (0.039) 0.393* (0.026) 0.432* (0.015) 0.488* (0.035)
αK 0.318* (0.017) 0.310* (0.010) 0.171* (0.032) 0.312* (0.008) 0.315* (0.009)
αL 0.546* (0.037) 0.548* (0.029) 0.592* (0.074) 0.568* (0.036) 0.562* (0.034)
γY – – – – 0.159* (0.050)
γQ – – – – 0.090* (0.013)
γN – – – – −0.150* (0.056)
γK – – – – −0.189* (0.067)
γL – – – – −0.193 (0.180)
α1986 0.010 (0.015) 0.009 (0.041) 0.009 (0.056) 0.022 (0.027) 0.017 (0.035)
α1987 0.020 (0.015) 0.012 (0.031) 0.003 (0.056) 0.032 (0.025) 0.029 (0.031)
α1988 0.039* (0.015) 0.028 (0.044) 0.010 (0.057) 0.051 (0.037) 0.049 (0.050)
α1989 0.065* (0.016) 0.052 (0.046) 0.036 (0.057) 0.076* (0.033) 0.074 (0.050)
α1990 0.084* (0.016) 0.068 (0.036) 0.024 (0.058) 0.097* (0.034) 0.94* (0.044)
α1991 0.098* (0.017) 0.078* (0.029) 0.030 (0.058) 0.114* (0.028) 0.111* (0.035)
α1992 0.111* (0.017) 0.094* (0.034) 0.046 (0.058) 0.130* (0.026) 0.122* (0.034)
α1993 0.100* (0.017) 0.081* (0.034) 0.015 (0.057) 0.119* (0.026) 0.112* (0.034)
α1994 0.082* (0.017) 0.063 (0.040) −0.001 (0.056) 0.103* (0.037) 0.093* (0.039)
α1995 0.059* (0.016) 0.048 (0.032) 0.019 (0.057) 0.081* (0.023) 0.064 (0.034)
α1996 0.037* (0.017) 0.028 (0.024) 0.027 (0.057) 0.066* (0.022) 0.043 (0.025)
α1997 0.038* (0.018) 0.030 (0.032) 0.019 (0.060) 0.063 (0.039) 0.042 (0.032)
α0 – −4.90* (0.57) −8.31* (0.98) −3.89* (0.51) −1.89 (2.66)
σα – – – 0.783* (0.027) 0.751* (0.058)
σ =
√
σ 2u +σ 2v – 0.807* (0.14) 0.464* (0.001) 0.109* (0.005) 0.095* (0.005)
λ=σu /σv – 11.37* (3.81) 2.88* (0.30) 2.58* (0.56) 1.59* (0.031)
Standard errors are given in brackets. * means significant at less than 5%.
The sample includes 605 observations (50 railway companies).
the fact that in the short run railway companies cannot vary much of their capital
stock such as equipment and machinery.
Comparing the results from different models in Table 4 shows that all models
except model III, have reasonably comparable coefﬁcients. In model III (pooled
model) variations over time and within ﬁrms are treated exactly similar to those
between different ﬁrms. Moreover, the unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects are com-
pletely neglected, which may bias the estimations. A Lagrange Multiplier test
on an OLS model strongly rejects the hypothesis that the residuals of a given
company are uncorrelated (test statistic of 2990 for a chi-square with 1 degree
of freedom), suggesting that the pooled model is mis-speciﬁed. Moreover, the
Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects are uncorrelat-
ed with the explanatory variables (test statistic of 61.5 for a chi-square with 17
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degrees of freedom). This result suggests that models that do not account for these
correlations can give biased results. Given the relatively high number of periods
(on average 12 years) and the reasonable within-company variations (see Table 3)
in the sample, the ﬁxed effects model’s results can be considered as unbiased esti-
mates of the cost function parameters. Therefore, the coefﬁcients estimated from
model I are used as a benchmark for assessing the potential heterogeneity bias in
other models.
Compared to model I , the parameter estimates in the pooled model (III) have
the highest differences. The estimated coefﬁcients in the remaining models are
fairly close to those of the FE model, suggesting that heterogeneity biases in
the coefﬁcients are not substantial. This statement does not apply to the inefﬁ-
ciency estimates, which as we will see later, show considerable biases. As seen in
Table 4, there is no clear distinction between models II and IV concerning the
heterogeneity biases. While in certain coefﬁcients model IV is closer to the unbi-
ased estimates (model I ), in some others model II shows a ‘better’ performance.
The random effects speciﬁcation in both models II and IV has however a short-
coming in that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity terms (ui in model II and αi in
model IV) are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. If we put
any trust in the Hausman speciﬁcation test, this assumption is not realistic. More-
over, as discussed earlier, it is plausible that some of the unobserved network char-
acteristics be correlated with the network length. Such correlations are taken into
account in model V through the auxiliary coefﬁcients’ γx). The results in Table 4
indicate that model V shows the smallest differences with the unbiased estimators
of model I . This suggests that applying Mundlak’s (1978) adjustment to the TRE
model (model IV) can decrease the heterogeneity biases. As shown in the table, the
auxiliary coefﬁcients (γx) are all signiﬁcant. These coefﬁcients can be interpreted
as the correlation effect between the unobserved ﬁrm characteristics and the cor-
responding explanatory variable. For instance, the positive signs of γY and γQ sug-
gest that keeping all observed factors ﬁxed, networks with higher outputs are more
likely to belong to the ‘high-cost’ or ‘difﬁcult’ networks; and the negative signs of
γN , γK and γL suggest that larger networks and companies that have higher input
prices are more likely to be in the ‘low-cost’ category.
Table 5 provides a descriptive summary of the inefﬁciency estimates from differ-
ent models (see Table 1, last row). These estimates represent the relative excess cost
of a given ﬁrm compare to a minimum level that would have been achieved if the
ﬁrm had operated as efﬁciently as the ‘best practice’ observed in the sample. In
comparing different models it should be noted that in the ﬁrst two models (I and
II), the inefﬁciency is assumed to be constant over time. Moreover, in these mod-
els all the unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc differences are interpreted as inefﬁciency. As
expected, both models I and II, especially the FE model, predict rather unrealis-
tic inefﬁciency scores averaging about 0.7 to 0.8 and up to a maximum of 2 to
2.5. According to these models, a typical company can save about a third of its
costs by a more efﬁcient allocation of resources. These high values indicate that
the heterogeneity across companies is an important driver of cost differences and
that neglecting it may create a substantial upward bias in inefﬁciency scores.
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Table 5. Inefficiency Measures
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
FE RE Pooled True RE True RE with Mundlak
Mean 0.813 0.696 0.343 0.078 0.063
Median 0.676 0.662 0.289 0.061 0.053
Maximum 2.507 1.992 0.848 0.386 0.311
95 percentile 1.723 1.470 0.848 0.187 0.134
Minimum 0.000 0.160 0.060 0.011 0.012
N 605 605 605 605 605
In model III the inefﬁciency estimates are in a more realistic range, with an
average of 0.34 and a maximum value of 0.85. These values though still too high
to be convincing, are substantially lower than those predicted by models I andII;
and this despite the fact that the pooled model (III) does not account for unob-
served heterogeneity. This attenuation of inefﬁciency estimates can be explained
by the structure of the inefﬁciency term in model III. Given that the inefﬁciency
term (uit ) is assumed to be independently and identically distributed over time and
across companies, it cannot fully capture the ﬁrm-speciﬁc differences that are time-
invariant, thus such differences are partly suppressed into and bias the model’s
coefﬁcients.
Both models IV and V , which have separate stochastic terms for inefﬁciency
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity, have quite reasonable inefﬁciency estimates about
6–8% on average and 31–38% on maximum. The substantial decrease in these val-
ues compared to other models, suggests that these models can separate to a con-
siderable extent, the heterogeneity from the inefﬁciency. To understand the reasons
behind these results, it is helpful to note that the sole difference between models
III and IV is that model IV includes an additional ﬁrm-speciﬁc random term (αi).
This term represents the variations across ﬁrms, which are about seven times larger
than the variation within ﬁrms (compare σα to σ in the lower panel of Table 4).
Given that the unobserved heterogeneity is potentially correlated with the
explanatory variables and that these correlations are not taken into account in
model IV the resulting inefﬁciency scores may capture some of these differences.
This issue can be explored by comparing models IV and V . In model V the time-
invariant cost differences across companies are separated from inefﬁciency esti-
mates (as in model IV). In addition, the possible correlations with explanatory
variables are mitigated through auxiliary coefﬁcients. The results in Table 5 show
that when such correlations are controlled for (model V ), the inefﬁciency estimates
slightly decline (by about .015 on average and by 0.075 on maximum). According
to this model the average (median) company is only 6.3 (5.3) percent inefﬁcient,
and the maximum inefﬁciency in 95 percent of the sample is limited to 13.4 per-
cent. These results suggest that model V not only provides unbiased, or close to
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Table 6. Pair-wise Correlation Between Inefficiency Estimates
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
FE RE Pooled True RE True RE with Mundlak
Model I 1
Model II 0.932* 1
Model III 0.497* 0.614* 1
Model IV −0.247 −0.256 −0.158 [.092*] 1
Model V −0.334* −0.320* −0.197 [.105*] 0.948* [0.971*] 1
The correlation coefficients have been estimated over the firms (50 observations) that is, average values over
the sample period are used in models with time-variant inefficiency (III, IV and V).
Correlation coefficients based on 605 observations are given in brackets.
* significant at 5%.
unbiased, estimates of the cost function’s coefﬁcients, it can also better separate the
heterogeneity from inefﬁciency.
The pair-wise correlation coefﬁcients between the inefﬁciency estimates from
different models are listed in Table 6. In order for the correlation coefﬁcients to
be comparable, they are calculated at the ﬁrm level using 50 observations (one
observation for each ﬁrm). Namely, in models with time-variant efﬁciency, the
inefﬁciency score is calculated as the ﬁrm’s average inefﬁciency score over the sam-
ple period. For models with time-variant inefﬁciency the correlation coefﬁcients are
also given over the 605 observations.
As shown in Table 6, models I and II, and models IV and V show a rela-
tively high correlation.20 However, except a few cases the correlation coefﬁcients
are quite low, suggesting substantial differences across models.21 Especially, models
IV and V show a negative correlation with all other models. Given that the corre-
lation coefﬁcients are calculated on company-average inefﬁciency scores, the weak
(and negative) correlations may suggest that the inefﬁciency estimates vary con-
siderably from one year to another, in which case the correlation between models
with constant and time-variant inefﬁciency should be weak. However, this can only
partly explain the observed correlations. In fact the positive and fairly strong cor-
relation between the pooled model III (with time-variant efﬁciency) and both mod-
els I and II (with time-invariant efﬁciency) indicates that averaging cannot explain
the negative correlations.
The negative correlation coefﬁcients (Table 6) point to a striking distinction
between the models IV and V and all other models, which do not distin-
guish unobserved heterogeneity from inefﬁciency. The negative correlations man-
ifest especially in model V in which the correlations with observed factors are
20 These results are consistent with Farsi et al. (2005) who used a similar method for a sample of
nursing homes.
21 The rank correlations show similar patterns. These results are omitted to avoid repetition.
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taken into account. These values suggest that some of the unobserved network
characteristics may actually be negatively correlated with company’s average inefﬁ-
ciency. One interpretation is that the relatively complex thus costly networks are
more likely to be operated by an efﬁcient management. This is a plausible expla-
nation because the companies with complex networks are more likely to have a
general awareness and perhaps the required expertise for technical problems. Such
expertise can directly or indirectly contribute to the ﬁrm’s efﬁciency. The results in
Table 6 highlight the importance of unobserved heterogeneity, as failure to account
for such factors can result in a completely misleading and even reverse picture of
inefﬁciencies.
The estimation of a cost function enables us to derive important characteris-
tics of the supply technology such as economies of density and scale. In line with
Caves et al. (1985), the economies of density are deﬁned as the inverse of the elas-
ticity of costs with respect to outputs that is, the relative increase in total cost
resulting from an increase in outputs, holding all input prices and the network size
constant:
ED= 1
∂ lnT C
∂ lnY + ∂ lnT C∂ lnQ
. (4)
Economies of density exist if the above expression (ED) has a value greater than
one. For values of ED below one, we identify diseconomies of density. In the case
of ED= 1, the company’s output minimizes its costs given the network’s size.
Slightly different is the deﬁnition of economies of scale (ES).22 Here, the
increase in total costs is brought about by an increase in company’s scale that is
in both outputs and the network size, holding the factor prices constant. The com-
monly used deﬁnition is the one proposed by Caves et al. (1984), which assumes
that any increase in size raises the network size and the outputs with the same pro-
portion. Based on this assumption, ES is deﬁned as:
ES= 1
∂ lnT C
∂ lnY + ∂ lnT C∂ lnQ + ∂ lnT C∂ lnN
. (5)
Similarly, economies of scale exist if ES is higher than 1. Table 7 shows the esti-
mates of scale and density economies as given in Equations (4) and (5), obtained
from different models.
As can be seen in Table 7, both economies of density and scale are greater than
one across all models, suggesting the presence of unexploited economies in most
22 It should be noted that the adopted deﬁnitions of scale and density economies do not necessarily
correspond to those based on the production function. In fact, only in homothetic production
functions, where the optimal input bundles vary proportionately, the two deﬁnitions are equivalent.
In this paper, we do not impose homotheticity. However, as we are interested in the cost effects of
output, we deﬁne the scale and density economies as the inverse of the corresponding cost
elasticities. See Chambers (1988) for more details.
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Table 7. Economies of Scale and Density
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
FE RE Pooled True RE True RE + Mundlak
ED 7.79 4.51 1.91 5.82 8.18
ES 1.74 1.42 1.09 1.65 1.64
companies in the sample. As expected, the economies obtained from an increase
in output density in a given network (density economies) are relatively higher than
those gained by extending a company’s network (scale economies). The results
listed in Table 7 show a variation of the values of ED and ES between differ-
ent models. This variation can be partially explained by the models’ differences
with respect to the unobserved network effects. If these effects are correlated with
explanatory variables (such as output and network length) the values obtained
from the ﬁxed effect model (Model I ) and the Mundlak version of the True RE
(Model V ) are unbiased and those of the other three models are biased. Particu-
larly, the values estimated by the pooled model (Model III) are likely to be biased
downward. These results suggest that ignoring the unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects
can bias the estimated coefﬁcients. In fact such biases are driven by possible cor-
relation of unobserved effects with output and network length.
6. Conclusion
The most relevant measure included in the railway reform of 1996 is the change
from the practice of ex-post deﬁcit coverage to an ex-ante ﬁxed payment sys-
tem for transport services. In this context cost frontier models could be useful in
determining the amount of subsidies granted to the regional railway companies.
Moreover, such models could be used for benchmarking analyses aimed at induc-
ing productive efﬁciency among railway companies. Such applications are however
hampered in practice partly because of the strong unobserved heterogeneity in rail-
way networks, which might be confounded with the company’s inefﬁciency. This
paper casts some light on the performance of different cost frontier models in pres-
ence of unobserved heterogeneity.
Alternative cost frontier models applied to a panel of Swiss railway companies
indicate that the estimations particularly the inefﬁciency estimates, are sensitive
to the adopted speciﬁcation. The data show a considerable unobserved ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc heterogeneity that is likely to be correlated with explanatory variables. In
such cases unbiased coefﬁcients can be obtained from the ﬁxed effects model.
This model’s estimates of inefﬁciency are however unrealistic. In fact, comparing
the results across different models suggest that the inefﬁciency estimates largely
depend upon how the unobserved heterogeneity across ﬁrms is speciﬁed. Panel
data models such as Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) that do
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not distinguish between unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity and inefﬁciency can
overestimate the overall inefﬁciencies or even give misleading patterns of inefﬁ-
ciency. The cost frontier random effects model labeled as ‘true’ random-effects
model (Greene, 2005) provides reasonable estimates of inefﬁciency suggesting that
the inefﬁciency estimates in other models could be confounded with unobserved
heterogeneity. However, the problem of this model is that because of potential cor-
relation between heterogeneity and explanatory variables, the cost function coefﬁ-
cients may be biased (heterogeneity bias), especially as the Hausman speciﬁcation
test conﬁrms the presence of such correlations.
An auxiliary equation in line with Mundlak (1978) can be helpful in this regard.
This adjustment has been applied to the ‘true’ random effects. The resulting spec-
iﬁcation shows a very low level of heterogeneity bias, while slightly reducing the
inefﬁciency estimates. The high correlation between the inefﬁciency scores across
the two models suggests that in so far as the heterogeneity is accounted for, the
correlation between heterogeneity and explanatory variables does not considerably
affect the inefﬁciency estimates.
From a policy point of view, this study suggests that the Mundlak version of
the “true” random effects model is a promising technique that could be used
in regulation of railway networks. While emphasizing that a mechanical use of
any of these models could be misleading, we contend that cost frontier models
can be used as a complementary control instrument in benchmarking and evalu-
ation of subsidy requests in the Swiss Regional Railways. For instance, as shown
by Farsi and Filippini (2004) for the case of electricity networks, the regulator
could use these models to predict a conﬁdence interval for the costs of each
one of the ﬁrms. Acceptable intervals for revenue and price caps can be calcu-
lated accordingly. Using such predictions along with other monitoring instruments,
the regulator can hold the companies within a reasonably well-predicted range of
cost-efﬁciency.
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